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abStract.
Progress in achieving the Millenium Development Goals (MDG) in Africa has 
been undermined by failure to reduce under-nutrition, yet efforts to increase 
agricultural output are circumscribed by indicators for MDG 7, particularly with 
regard to maintenance of forested areas and conservation of water resources. 
This implies that increasing agricultural production must be sought from 
agricultural intensification. The paper sets out the critical role that development 
of water resource management will play for agricultural intensification in Africa. 
It argues that past failure to invest in water for agriculture is now compounded 
by recent trends that are intensifying competition for land and water for 
agriculture. The paper concludes these are likely to increase uncertainty about 
prospects for improved nutrition that underpins the achievement of the MDGs 
in Africa. 
Keywords: Millenium Development Goals (MDG); Africa; Intensive 
Agriculture.
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reSumen.
Los progresos alcanzados en el logro de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del 
Milenio (ODM) en África se ven perjudicados por su incapacidad para reducir 
la desnutrición, en parte debido a que los esfuerzos por incrementar la 
producción agrícola se circunscriben al ODM 7, en particular a la conservación 
de los bosques y de los recursos hídricos. Ello implica que el aumento de la 
producción agrícola se afronta desde el punto de vista del desarrollo de la 
agricultura intensiva. Este artículo plantea el papel crítico que el desarrollo 
de la gestión de los recursos hídricos va a ejercer en la intensificación de la 
agricultura africana. Se argumenta que los fracasos anteriores en el desarrollo 
del regadío se ven complicados en la actualidad, cuando se observa un aumento 
de la competencia por la tierra y el agua para riego. El artículo concluye que 
estas tendencias aumentan la incertidumbre sobre el futuro de la mejora de la 
nutrición, necesaria para alcanzar los ODMs en África.
Palabras clave: Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio (ODM); África; 
Agricultura intensiva.
JEL Classification: N37, O15.
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1. introduction: the millennium development GoalS and environmental 
SuStainability.
In the discourse of international development the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) have rapidly attained the status of talisman for humanity’s 
better nature. The eight goals, subdivided into eighteen targets and 48 
indicators against which human progress is to be measured, have been the 
object of a consensus embraced by not only the UN agencies but also the 
OECD, IMF and World Bank (UNDP, 2010). All but two of the eight goals 
relate to the state of human health and education, with indicators relating to 
nutrition and income, school attendance, maternal and child mortality, and 
disease prevalence. As such, these goals may be related directly to economic 
growth and political (distributional) aspects of economic accumulation. Of 
the two exceptions, one (Goal 8) seeks ‘global partnership for development’, 
and addresses the international relationships deemed necessary to foster 
economic growth in poorer countries, notably through encouraging trade and 
investment and international transfer of new technology, while the other (Goal 
7) relates to ensuring environmental sustainability, with which this paper is 
primarily concerned. The United Nations’ (2009) Millennium Development 
Goals Report claims some progress towards meeting many of the goals, 
while cautioning that subsequent advances are likely to be restricted by 
economic recession. Moreover, such progress that has been achieved is 
disproportionately located in East and South-East Asia, while comparatively 
little improvement has been registered for sub-Saharan Africa in income, 
employment or labour productivity. Statistics that indicate more positive 
trends for African countries, such as those showing improvements in school 
enrolment and child mortality, are tempered by others showing slow progress 
in reducing child malnutrition. The latter are projected to worsen following 
food prices rises since 2007, particularly since, despite falls in international 
food commodity prices since early 2008, food prices in many developing 
countries have remained high, (UN, 2009: 11). As a consequence, renewed 
efforts to raise agricultural productivity are likely, particularly in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the proportion of undernourished people, estimated by the UN 
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(2009: 11) as 29% for 2008, has changed little from the figure (32%) for the 
years 1990-2. 
This paper addresses the challenges of increasing agricultural productivity 
in sub-Saharan Africa. It argues that the development of water resources is 
a key factor among these challenges, and that, although this has long been 
recognised, water development for agriculture has not been effectively 
integrated into support for the majority of African farmers. Moreover, water 
use for agriculture will in future be subject to a set of new imperatives and 
constraints linked to official perceptions of environmental change. These may 
be traced to two principal environmental concerns: that of restricting the area 
occupied by agriculture in order to conserve natural resources, and that of 
mitigation of climate change. The paper argues that in both cases, however, it is 
policy measures responding to these concerns that are likely to have a greater 
effect than the environmental hazards themselves. 
To some extent, this latter point can be illustrated by the Millennium 
Development Goals themselves. In particular, the indicators for Goal 7 – to 
‘ensure environmental sustainability’ – include several that imply severe 
restrictions on expansion of land and water use for agriculture. Thus, indicators 
7.1 (proportion of land area occupied by forest), 7.5 (proportion of total 
water resources used), and 7.6 (proportion of terrestrial and marine areas 
protected) all imply ‘improvement’ through preventing conversion of forest or 
other ‘wild’ ecosystems to farmland. This goal is often justified by reference to 
observations that deforestation rates in sub-Saharan Africa, at 4.1 million ha 
per year, are among the highest in the world (UN, 2009: 43). However, data 
from the World Database of Protected Areas shows that while the proportion of 
a country’s territory set aside as ‘protected areas’ averaged about 5% for sub-
Saharan African countries in the 1960s, by 2000 this average had more than 
doubled (Brockington et al., 2008: 30-31). The extent to which this expansion 
of ‘protection’ actually restricts agriculture is not entirely clear, since official 
figures do not always indicate the intensity with which protection (ie exclusion 
of cultivation) is enforced in specific areas. The designation ‘protected areas’ 
includes all six categories defined by the World Conservation Union (IUCN). 
These include some (category I ‘nature reserve’ and category II ‘national park’) 
which are required to ‘contain one or more entire ecosystems not materially 
altered by current human occupation or exploitation’, while others, (category 
V ‘protected landscape’ and category VI ‘managed resource protected area’) 
allow management to “support lifestyles and economic activities which are in 
harmony with nature and the preservation of the social and cultural fabric of the 
communities concerned’ or to promote “practices for sustainable production 
purposes” (UNEP-WCMC, 2010). Thus the total ‘protected area’ will include 
some areas in which (‘traditional’) agriculture is tolerated but others in which 
it is not. 
Despite this uncertainty, the trend towards increasing appropriation of land 
in the name of biodiversity conservation suggests that agricultural expansion 
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in many African countries faces increasing competition from other types of 
land use. As a consequence, increases in agricultural output must be sought 
from intensification of agricultural activity: that is, increasing output from the 
same or smaller land area, rather than expansion of the area cultivated. In 
the following sections the paper first sets out the critical role of development 
of water resource management for agricultural intensification in Africa, and 
its comparative neglect in recent decades. It then identifies new dynamics, 
and notably those linked with strategies of mitigation of, and adaptation to, 
climate change, that will influence the pattern of water resource development 
for agriculture in Africa, and discusses their implications for agricultural 
intensification.
2. water reSourceS and aGricultural intenSification.
2.1. water manaGement and the criSiS in african aGriculture.
In discussing limitations to agricultural productivity in Africa, it is important 
to recognise that policy debate has been heavily influenced by ‘crisis 
narratives’, such as: ‘over 45 percent of Africa is affected by desertification’ 
(UNEP, 2006). While influential, most continent-wide assertions of this 
kind are not based on unequivocal data or rigorous analysis (Thomas and 
Middleton, 1994). Reij et al. (1996: 1-4) observe that estimates of soil erosion 
in Africa may be based on little more than ‘informed guesswork’, or unjustified 
extrapolation of small-scale measurements of soil loss to characterise entire 
landscapes or regions. Such aggregate estimates are therefore unhelpful as a 
guide to understanding the nature of constraints to agricultural productivity. 
This is not to deny that agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa is 
low by comparison with almost every other geographical region. Mean 
cereal yields in Africa, at 1.89 tonnes per hectare in 2008, are less than 
half those in Latin America and barely a third of those typical of developed 
countries (FAO, 2010). Equally, many people in rural areas in Africa live in 
extreme poverty or seek a better life by migrating to towns and cities. While 
this is clear evidence of an economic and social crisis, its connection to the 
management or degradation of natural resources cannot be understood in 
terms of simple causal models, such as ‘population growth’ or lack of private 
property rights (‘tragedy of the commons’), or even ‘globalisation’ and the 
disruption or erosion of traditional institutions. Rather, the nature of the 
‘crisis’ needs to be characterised through empirical study of specific contexts. 
This argument and its implications for environmental management in Africa 
have been more fully explored by Bernstein and Woodhouse (2006). They 
observe that the critical role of investment of capital and/or labour in order 
to raise and sustain productivity in the use of natural resources, means that 
processes of environmental conservation and degradation will reflect socio-
economic differentiation. Those with capacity to invest capital or labour in 
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more productive farming methods will be best placed to conserve the natural 
resources (especially land) they use. Conversely, in the absence of social 
investment (e.g. by the state), the poorest land users will be most likely to 
over-exploit and degrade their land. Thus, in areas with strong economic 
differentiation among the population, both degradation (by the poor) and 
conservation (by the better-off) may be occurring simultaneously in the same 
area. Such patterns are also likely to be associated with transfer of resources 
such as land from poorer to wealthier households over time (Murton, 1999).
For the two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa that lies outside the equatorial 
humid zone, water is the key constraint to agricultural production. These 
areas are characterised by ‘savanna’ vegetation consisting of a great range of 
grassland types with widely differing densities of trees, reflecting the principle 
underlying influence of rainfall. Annual rainfall may vary from as little as 
400mm in ‘Sahelian’ climate zones to up to 1200mm in ‘savanna woodlands’, 
but in all cases is strongly seasonal, being restricted to 4-5 months per year. 
In all savanna zones inter-annual variation of rainfall is high and thus the risk 
of large deviations from average (including years of very low rainfall) is also 
high. African agriculture includes many different approaches to reducing risks 
associated with low and unreliable rainfall. Reij et al. (1996) provide case 
studies of many of these, which they classify as ‘indigenous soil and water 
conservation’, including methods to retain rainfall and prevent soil erosion 
through devices such as terraces, trenches and pits, and stone or earth 
barriers across fields. Indigenous technology also includes stream diversion 
for crop irrigation, such as in the Chagga culture on the slopes of Kilimanjiro, 
and construction of drainage ditches and cultivation of raised beds in low-lying 
wetlands, such as in the Nyanga highlands of Zimbabwe (Soper, 2006). More 
generally, agricultural production is commonly split so as to occupy a variety 
of topographical positions so as to spread risk associated with rainfall (floods 
in lower lying sites in wet years, drought of higher, better-drained sites in drier 
years). 
state-led water ManageMent. 
Colonial administrations sought to secure a major increase in cash crops for 
export through the construction of large-scale irrigation schemes. Two major 
examples from the 1920s, both designed to produce cotton, were the Gezira 
scheme on the Nile in Sudan, and the Office du Niger in Mali. Productivity on 
such schemes proved disappointing, however, and a major stimulus to new 
irrigation investment came only in the 1970s, when two decades of relatively 
high rainfall in West Africa were followed by two decades of relatively dry years 
that began with a severe drought in 1972-3. The impact of these drought years 
on agricultural output and livelihoods in the Sahel and in Ethiopia cannot be 
attributed solely to changes in rainfall, but reflected also changes in land use 
and other economic activity which increased the vulnerability of many rural 
households to drought since the 1950s, particularly as a consequence of the 
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expansion of cultivation into more drought-prone areas during the decades 
of good rainfall (Franke and Chasin, 1980; Agnew, 2002). Nonetheless, the 
association of drought with food insecurity in the Sahel firmly established 
within international development discourse an environmental dimension to 
Africa’s crisis of agricultural productivity. Yet, despite a clear identification 
of drought as a key factor in low productivity, the development of irrigation 
in Africa made relatively little headway, when compared to developments in 
South Asian countries such as India and Bangladesh. Irrigated agriculture is 
estimated (UNDP, 2006: 177) to account for less than five percent of African 
agriculture, compared to nearly 40 percent in South Asia. Consequently, 
although agriculture accounts for 85 percent of all water withdrawals for 
economic activity in Africa, this represents only 2-3 percent of African internal 
renewable water resources, compared to 25-35 percent in South Asia. 
Any effort to interpret the significance of such comparisons is hampered 
by the extremely weak data available on the extent of water management 
in African agriculture. Most figures discriminate between a ‘formal’ irrigation 
sector, equipped for full or partial water control, and ‘informal’ or ‘non-equipped’ 
cultivation of lowland areas. ‘Formal’ irrigation is typically state-funded and uses 
standard engineering structures (dams, canals, pumps) to store and distribute 
water on the floodplains of major river systems. ‘Informal’ or ‘non-equipped’ 
lowland cultivation typically use indigenous technology to achieve a measure 
of water management , for example through drainage of wetlands or planting 
crops following a receding flood. Taken together, these categories have been 
estimated (FAO, 2005) to constitute a total of 15.4 million ha of “areas under 
water management” in Africa. However, nearly half of this is in North Africa and 
Madagascar. The remaining 8 million ha in sub-Saharan Africa is split between 
some 6 million ha of formal (full or partial control) irrigation and 2 million ha of 
areas under informal water management. 
These figures quite explicitly omit any mention of ‘dryland’ water 
management, such as rainwater harvesting or other techniques for retaining 
and conserving rainfall, such as terraces, pits, contour ridges and stone lines, 
and so on (Reij et al, 1996; Rockstrom et al., 2003). Such techniques are 
widely used in cultivation of drier savannas and their exclusion must evidently 
underestimate the extent of water management used in African agriculture. 
This is consistent with the relative neglect of such ‘indigenous technology’ 
within agricultural research for much of the 20th century. Indeed, in some 
instances government policy hampered indigenous risk-reduction strategies, 
and made risks of crop failure higher, for example by prohibiting cultivation of 
wetlands in many parts of southern Africa (Whitlow, 1983), or by promoting 
comparatively costly or ineffectual measures, such as contour-ridges with high 
labour requirements for maintenance (Lutz et al. 1994). Consistent with these 
earlier policy positions, there is a continuing tendency of development agencies 
to address questions of improved water availability in African agriculture in 
terms of a relatively narrow set of ‘irrigation’ options. 
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However, reviews undertaken in the 1980s make clear that state-managed 
irrigation systems, in which African cultivators were typically tenants of the 
state, suffered from a number of specific design problems. These included 
physical design failures, such as cost-cutting measures that omitted adequate 
drainage and led to waterlogging and salinization after the schemes were 
put into operation (Moris and Thom 1985), or inappropriate dimensions of 
reservoirs or pumping stations due to designs based on inadequate river flow 
records (Hocombe et al., 1986). Other problems resulted from inadequate 
budgets for supporting infrastructure such as roads, resulting in poor market 
access, or for compensating and re-settling populations displaced from sites 
of reservoirs or new irrigation areas (Adams, 1988). Yet further problems were 
encountered over state agencies’ attempts to ensure that irrigated areas were 
used to produce commercial crops, usually rice or cotton, in the face of African 
cultivators’ priorities to produce staples such as sorghum or maize (van der 
Laan, 1984) or to devote part of the household labour to more remunerative 
non-agricultural work. As a consequence, government officials charged with 
enforcing the terms of tenancy on state-run irrigation encountered serious 
difficulties in obtaining cultivators’ compliance in planned crop production 
programmes or in credit repayments for the supply of water and inputs such as 
fertilizer. Taken together, this catalogue of design and implementation problems 
resulted in state-run schemes being operated at a net loss to public budgets 
and made them prime targets for divestiture under ‘structural adjustment’ 
measures to reduce government budgets.
2.2. water manaGement in the neo-liberal era.
Estimates in the mid-1980s put formal irrigation in sub-Saharan Africa 
at 2.64 million ha, with an additional 2.38 million ha of informal water 
management (Holcombe et al., 1986). In 1994, FAO estimated 5 million ha of 
formal irrigation, rising to 6 million in 2004, and about 2 million ha of informal 
water management, which remained unchanged across the decade (FAO, 
2005). If we ignore for the moment the obvious questions about accuracy of 
estimates of areas subject to informal water control, which we noted above, 
these figures suggest that investment in formal irrigation slowed substantially 
in the 1990s. In part this reflects a halt to public investment in irrigation in 
Africa for a decade from the mid-1980s, and some sources estimate that 
loans for irrigation and drainage in Africa were lower in 2002-5 than they had 
been in 1978-81 (CAWMA, 2007: 73). It should be noted that these figures 
relate to the extent of ‘areas equipped for irrigation’ through water storage and 
distribution infrastructure. In many cases lack of maintenance and operational 
budgets resulted in low proportions of these areas being harvested. Thus, while 
in Mali cropping intensity figures of 171 percent indicated that the irrigated 
area was not only fully cultivated but much of it was cultivated with more than 
two crops per year, in contrast in Senegal only 73 percent of the ‘equipped’ 
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irrigation area was actually harvested . Elsewhere, even lower rates of usage of 
areas equipped with irrigation infrastructure are recorded, such as 43 percent 
in Sudan, and 11 percent in Congo (FAO, 2005).
The moratorium on investment in irrigation since the 1980s was consistent 
with a broader decline in the relative importance of agriculture in development 
funders’ policies. Lending for agricultural development slipped from 30 percent 
of World Bank loans in 1980 to 7 percent in 2000, rising to 12 percent in 
2010 as a result of the rise in food prices in 2007-8 (IPS, 2010). However, 
there appears also a manifestation of the ideological shift within international 
financial institutions against state involvement in development activity and 
in favour of market mechanisms of resource allocation. This resulted not 
only in a halt to state investment in new irrigation, but a withdrawal of state 
agencies from managing existing irrigation, which was to be ‘turned over’ to 
farmers’ associations, with the private sector expected to provide services such 
as input supply, crop marketing and equipment servicing and replacement. 
The consequences of state disengagement from management of irrigation 
schemes during the 1990s have been mixed, and in many cases cannot be 
clearly separated from the outcomes of other processes, such as civil war, for 
example in Sudan. In some instances, it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
expectations that commercial entities would take over from state agencies as 
providers of services to irrigated agriculture were misplaced. 
In the Senegal River Valley, for example, the winding down of the state 
agency (SAED –Société d’Aménagement et d’Exploitation des terres du Delta 
du fleuve Sénégal) coincided with the completion of two dams (at Manantali 
and Diama) designed to regularise the flow of the river and control its annual 
flood and thus provide year-round irrigation on 300,000ha in the river valley, 
of which 224,000 ha on the left, or Senegalese, bank. The expectation under 
Senegal’s New Agricultural Policy of 1984 was that much of the expansion 
of irrigation from its existing extent of around 31,500ha in 1988 would be 
undertaken by investment by commercial entrepreneurs, while existing 
irrigation infrastructure would be managed by farmers’ associations. By 2003, 
the total area of irrigation recorded by the river basin authority (OMVS) on the 
Senegalese bank was 94,000ha. However, of this only 35,000 – 40,000ha 
were estimated to be in production (OMVS, 2003) – that is, little more than 
in 1988. Behind this marked failure to expand irrigated agriculture during 15 
years of market-based reform lie the effects of raised cost of inputs such as 
fertiliser previously subsidised by government. Farmers on the many smaller 
village-run irrigation schemes of the ‘Middle Valley’, more distant from the 
coastal cities of Dakar and Saint Louis (hence with higher transport costs) and 
producing mainly for household consumption, had little marketed output with 
which to cover increased production costs and most of such schemes were 
simply abandoned (Adams, 2000). 
Two further factors have markedly worsened conditions for many inhabitants 
of the Senegal River Valley. Firstly, the restriction of the annual flood has meant 
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the loss of some 100,000 ha. of crops previously planted under indigenous 
water management (flood-recession) in the valley (Adams, 2000). Secondly, the 
association of irrigation with de facto permanent occupation of land undermined 
existing customary land rights that were largely seasonal , following the annual 
flood regime that transformed land successively into fishing-ground, cultivated 
field, and then pasture. This transition to more exclusive land occupation, 
coupled with a political discourse of entrepreneurial investment by ‘outsiders’ 
resulted in heightened tensions over land rights that in 1989 precipitated 
violent confrontations between villages on both Senegalese and Mauretanian 
sides of the valley. These escalated into communitarian violence in Dakar and 
Nouakchott and the ‘repatriation’ of hundreds of thousands of people, many 
of whom had to be resettled as refugees within the valley. 
If the case of the Senegal river valley exemplifies the negative outcomes 
of precipitate withdrawal of state support for irrigated agriculture, the case 
of the Office du Niger, in Mali, describes a trajectory of incremental reform 
of state management that has been interpreted as producing more positive 
outcomes (Aw and Diemer, 2005). As with the SAED, productivity on the 
Office du Niger was declining by the early 1980s, but rather than rapid 
disengagement the government agency was encouraged to undertake a series 
of technical improvements in water management to raise yields and also to 
devolve certain areas of management (notably initial processing of the rice 
crop) to farmers’ organisations. Successive reforms have raised the role of 
farmers’ representatives in governing the management of the scheme. Average 
productivity of the principal (rice) crop trebled between the mid 1980s and 
2002 and an increasing area has been used to produce higher value crops, 
such as fruit and vegetables, adding a further 46 percent to the value of the 
scheme output in 2002. Higher levels of productivity have enabled higher fees 
to be charged for water and financing of further expansion of the irrigated area. 
Conversely, an estimated one third of those cultivating on the Office du Niger 
in 2002 struggled to achieve more than subsistence income (Aw and Diemer, 
2005: 68), and rising water fees threaten such households with eviction. In this 
instance of comparatively successful irrigation, therefore, there is evidence that 
the higher potential productivity afforded by irrigated farming may introduce 
demands to meet increased costs that may force out the less able or poorer 
farming households. Such pressures are liable to be intensified where state 
policy seeks further investment primarily through commercial partners, as will 
be explored further below.
Thus far I have considered primarily the trajectory of investment in ‘formal’ 
irrigation. It is important to observe that one consequence of the emphasis on 
private sector, rather than the state, for investment in irrigation infrastructure 
is that this sets up pressures towards exclusive or privatised access to both 
land and water that may quickly become manifest outside the commercial or 
formal irrigated sector, even among small-scale land users whose access to 
land and water is governed by customary authority (Woodhouse et al., 2000). 
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The interactions of such factors within what have been termed ‘vernacular land 
markets’ (Chimhowu and Woodhouse, 2006) will be considered in more detail 
in the next section. 
3. new challenGeS to developinG water uSe in aGriculture.
The previous section of the paper has identified how contradictory pressures 
within the MDGs drive a need for greater capital intensity in African agriculture. 
While many indicators of human wellbeing are predicated on improving levels of 
nutrition, sustainability indicators suggest that the future use of land and water 
for agriculture will be subject to constraints that are likely to be overcome only 
with substantial capital investment. Since the existing level of water resource 
development is very low in many African countries, it seems inevitable that 
increased agricultural productivity will require a ‘negative’ change in the value 
of sustainability indicator 7.5 (proportion of total water resources used). 
Thus, achievement of a majority of MDGs may require accepting less positive 
outcomes for others, particularly with respect to ‘sustainability’. In practice, 
development of irrigation is prone to a number of more localised negative 
environmental impacts, which can only be overcome by high standards of 
design, operation and maintenance. These impacts include salt accumulation 
in soils due to inadequate drainage, and proliferation of water-borne vectors of 
disease (e.g. malaria, schistosomiasis). While the MDGs thus contain elements 
that are contradictory, they need to be seen within a context in which rapid 
change is presenting new sets of challenges to the development of agriculture 
in Africa. In this section I will now consider the emergence of these, particularly 
those arising from perceptions of climate change. I will begin by outlining the 
predicted effects of climate change and then consider the impacts arising from 
policy measures that draw upon discourses of ‘climate change mitigation and 
adaptation’. 
Despite continuing controversy over predictions of climate change, the view 
of the fourth report of the IPCC (2007) is widely accepted: “Warming of the 
climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases 
in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and 
ice and rising global average sea level.” (IPCC, 2007: 30). However, beyond this 
general statement of average global conditions, and particularly for shorter 
time periods or for smaller geographical areas, prediction of impacts of climate 
change is subject to considerable uncertainty (Agnew and Woodhouse, 2011). 
Thus, for example, long-run trends of rising global temperature are subject to 
short-term reversals, as in 2008 when a marked decline in temperature was 
linked to La Niña ocean current circulation in the Pacific Ocean. ‘Downscaling’ 
predictions of future rainfall change from global circulation models based on 
energy flux is beset with particular difficulties and has given rise to contradictory 
scenarios for sub-Saharan Africa (Hulme, 1996). Determinants of inter-year 
rainfall variation at a regional scale are only recently becoming identified, as 
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with the relationship between rainfall intensity in East Africa and atmospheric 
circulation patterns resulting from changes in ocean surface temperature 
differentials in the Indian Ocean (Conwayet al., 2007). Moreover, such studies 
are hampered in sub-Saharan Africa, where rainfall records are subject to 
discontinuities and changes in geographical distribution of meteorological 
stations (Chappell and Agnew, 2004).
Given these levels of uncertainty, the most that can be said about climate 
change impacts on moisture availability in African agriculture is that it is likely 
to be subject to more extreme fluctuation, giving rise to greater risks from both 
floods and drought. In many respects this suggests that the constraint of rainfall 
uncertainty that confronts the majority of African farmers cultivating savanna 
areas today will continue to be the main constraint to farming in the future, 
if in more intense form. It is likely to make water management an even more 
central component of support to agricultural productivity. Such perceptions 
have led some to call for a massive expansion of irrigation in Africa, such as the 
Commission for Africa’s (2005) call for a doubling of irrigation (i.e. an increase 
of 7 million ha) by 2010. In practice, it seems clear that African governments 
in the 21st century find it difficult to emulate the model of large-scale water 
infrastructure development established by the US federal government, for 
example through construction of the Hoover and Grand Coulee Dams in the 
1930s, and more recently by the Chinese government with the Three Gorges 
Dam. Not only will it be difficult for African governments to raise capital for such 
projects, not least due to the past record of government agencies discussed 
earlier, but they are likely to be subject to intense international criticism on 
grounds of environmental impact, as in case of the Ugandan government’s 
15-year delay in construction of the Bujagali Dam on the Nile and Ethiopia’s 
construction of the Gibe III Dam on the Blue Nile (Rice, 2010). A more common 
approach is for African governments to seek agricultural development via 
agreements with foreign commercial agribusiness. A number of developments 
linked with climate change have made this more likely, principally through the 
expansion of ‘biofuels’ or ‘agro-fuels’.
Biofuels constitute the nexus through which a number of strands of energy 
policy have become linked with agricultural production, with major implications 
for land and water use in Africa. The principal driving force is a combination 
of environmental and security concerns that have diverted agricultural output 
from food to biofuel production (FAO, 2009). Thus, from 2004 the perception 
of rising oil prices as indicating diminishing oil stocks and insecurity of future 
energy supply prompted governments in the USA and EU to fund subsidies – 
estimated at over US$10 billion in 2006 alone - for the production of biofuel 
from agricultural crops. In 2007, this diverted some 30 percent of US maize 
output or 12 percent of world maize output into ethanol production (FAO, 
2009), reducing cereal availability for food supply and thus driving up food 
prices. Speculative activities further reinforced a short-lived food price ‘spike’ 
in 2007-8 during which some prices rose by as much as 100 times (Imai et 
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al., 2008; Ghosh, 2010), before dropping back again. The political climate 
favouring production of biofuel was reinforced by environmental arguments 
that they constitute a renewable energy source that can substitute fossil fuel 
(petroleum), and thus reduce net carbon emissions as part of a strategy to 
mitigate climate change. Biofuels are therefore the link through which growing 
concerns with climate change reinforce and accentuate the rise in agricultural 
commodity prices that may already reflect rising fossil fuel costs, particularly 
in nitrogen fertiliser. It is important to note that not only is most1 biofuel 
production uneconomic, requiring subsidies as observed above, but it does not 
necessarily produce a net reduction in carbon emissions (Pimental and Patzek 
2005). The more important conclusion is that policy decisions favouring biofuel 
production on grounds of climate change mitigation and energy security have 
become a factor driving up agricultural commodity prices and are likely, as 
a consequence, to promote competition for control of land, water and other 
inputs to agricultural production. The dimensions of this impact on international 
agriculture can be gauged from projected increases in land areas dedicated to 
biofuel production in Brazil, from 20 million ha currently to 60million ha in the 
case of sugarcane (ethanol), and from 6 million ha currently to 30 million ha 
in the case of soya bean (bio-diesel). Similarly Indonesian oil palm production 
for biodiesel is planned to rise from its current 6 million ha to 30 million ha by 
2030 (Brand, 2010). 
The combination of subsidised prices for biofuel production and its 
consequence, a prospect of rising food commodity prices has had the 
effect of galvanizing interest of international finance capital in agricultural 
production, prompting acquisition of large areas of agricultural land in Africa 
, Latin America and South-East Asia by a variety of international commercial 
investors (Cotula et al, 2009; Mann and Smaller, 2010). It is the transactions 
in Africa, which typically involve land acquired as 40-99 year leases agreed 
between commercial companies and African governments, that have aroused 
the greatest controversy, and have been denounced by some as a ‘land grab’. 
Concern centres partly on the use of land for biofuel in countries subject to 
food shortages, and partly on the perception that some investors, notably 
those from high-income food importing countries in the Middle East, plan to 
use the land (particularly that acquired through agreements with the Ethiopian 
government) to produce food destined exclusively for domestic (i.e. Middle 
East) markets. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the ramifications of these 
land deals in detail, and it is in any case premature to assess the impact of 
agreements that have only recently been announced. A number of observations 
are worth making, however. Firstly, there is evidence that such investments 
in agricultural production, particularly those in ‘less risky’ South East Asian 
locations, have quickly become packaged into financial instruments for sale 
1 The exception being ethanol produced from sugar cane in Brazil (FAO, 2009).
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to a wide range of potential investors, offering scope for a speculative ‘bubble’ 
fuelled by rising agricultural commodity prices. There may therefore be some 
instability in the capital base for these investments, as also for similar land 
deals for afforestation schemes premised on the sale of ‘carbon credits’ derived 
from carbon dioxide sequestered from the atmosphere by the growing trees. 
Secondly, although capital investment in agricultural production can potentially 
bring considerable economic benefits to local rural populations, in terms of 
employment, technological transfer, and improved services and infrastructure, 
it is not clear that these are always specified in the terms of agreements on 
land acquisition. Indeed it has been observed that the agreements, where they 
have been made public at all, contain very few details as to what benefits 
are to be generated and for whom (Cotula, et al., 2009). Thirdly, relatively 
few of the agreements have yet been translated into productive agricultural 
activity. To do so will mean overcoming considerable obstacles arising from 
poor communications infrastructure and consequent increased costs that have 
historically disadvantaged mechanised agriculture in many rural parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. Finally, the deals generally are characterised as ‘land deals’ but 
are in effect deals to acquire water. This is particularly evident in instances of 
investment by Middle Eastern sovereign funds to produce for their ‘domestic’ 
markets. More generally, however, since water , rather than land, is the more 
important constraint to agricultural production in sub-Saharan Africa, it is in 
guarantees of priority use of water that such investments may pose the most 
significant questions about their wider impact on African agriculture. 
The impact of such deals is illustrated in concerns over recent agreements 
by the Malian government to seek Libyan investment to rapidly expand the 
Office du Niger from its existing 67,000ha by a further 100,000ha through 
construction of a new canal from the Niger river. In principal, the water 
available in the Niger is sufficient to irrigate a greatly enlarged scheme, but 
concerns arise from the observation that the Libyan agricultural subsidiary in 
Mali, Malibya, “is negotiating with the Malian government for priority in water 
allocation during the off-season, when water levels are low.” (GRAIN, 2009). 
This is of particular concern because it is the ‘off-season’ crop – typically 
vegetables – that are the most lucrative output from the irrigation scheme. This 
raises the possibility that even without displacing existing Malian cultivators 
from their land on the Office du Niger, the new agreement could have the effect 
of undermining their profitable use of the irrigation system in favour of foreign-
owned agricultural producers.
Taken together, these factors suggest that African agriculture will be 
subject to increasing pressures driven by international concerns over food and 
energy supplies, and mediated by financial investment from both international 
corporate and foreign state interests. Such pressures and the international 
action taken in response to them are likely to be legitimated by underlying 
uncertainties associated with the international consensus on climate 
change. One consequence of these new pressures is to highlight the status 
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and functioning of legal rights over resources such as land and water. This is 
significant because in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa the past two decades 
have witnessed a wave of reforms of both land and water legislation, much 
of which remains ‘work in progress’. Most importantly, from the perspective 
of support to agricultural productivity, land and water reforms have generally 
been pursued independently. I will briefly identify elements of these processes 
before considering the relationship between them.
Reform of land tenure has been driven by concerns that the forms of 
customary tenure that typically apply to 90 percent of land in sub-Saharan 
Africa (World Bank, 2003) are insufficiently ‘secure’ , on the one hand to 
protect the poor from distress sales, and on the other to provide incentives 
for investment. These two perspectives mark a dichotomy between the goals 
of land reform, with the former emphasising strengthened collective rights 
which may not be transferred (e.g. by sale or rental) outside a defined land-
holding ‘community’, and the latter advocating a move to register land titles 
as individually owned and transferable through a land market. In practice, a 
dual form of land tenure continues in many parts of sub-Saharan Africa, either 
as a consequence of formal legislation (e.g in Zimbabwe and Mozambique) 
which identifies a category of community land tenure distinct from private, 
‘commercial’, or ‘estate’ land titles, or because implementation of plans for the 
formal registration of individuals’ customary rights has so far proved beyond 
government administrative capacity (e.g. in Uganda). While land reform 
has tended to focus on questions of property rights, water reform has laid 
more stress on payment for water use, while property rights have remained 
vested in a collectivity – typically the state. This pattern has been associated 
with ‘Integrated Water Resource Management’ (IWRM) which effectively 
subordinates individual water use to an authority based on a hydrological unit 
(usually a river catchment or basin). IWRM is one of the ‘Dublin Principles’ that 
have informed water reforms since they were formulated by an international 
conference in Dublin in 1992 (Young et al., 1994). The other principles refer to 
the need for water to be treated as an economic good, and hence paid for, and 
the need for democratic governance that is representative of all water users. 
Water reforms have thus focused on delineating control of water allocation 
decisions between central government ministries and decentralised river basin 
committees of water users. 
One consequence of the ‘sectoral ‘ separation of reform processes is 
that water reform tends to deal with water use through formal, discrete 
infrastructure. While this would evidently include formal irrigation schemes, 
it is much less clear how ‘integrated water management’ addresses the water 
used ‘informally’ by small-scale farmers, whether through small dams or water 
harvesting or through ‘non-equipped’ wetland cultivation. In practice, it seems 
likely that informal water management is largely excluded from oversight by 
catchment management committees. This is exemplified in South Africa’s 
Catchment Management Agencies (CMA), created by the National Water Act 
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of 1998. While a CMA is expected to take on responsibility for allocation 
of water through the issue of water permits (and the levy of charges) to 
individual water users, in ex-bantustan areas where land use is dominated 
by large numbers of small-scale cultivators, water use has in practice been 
allowed under ‘general authorisation’, to be administered by local customary, 
or ‘tribal’ authorities (Woodhouse, 2008). In such instances, water reforms 
effectively create a dualism in rights to water that parallels dualistic patterns 
of land rights noted above. 
It is legitimate to question whether the persistence of dualistic land 
and water rights constitute a problem. After all, this may be regarded as 
providing an escape for small-scale agricultural producers from bureaucratic 
land registration or water use permits. There are two reasons to question 
the adequacy of such arrangements for the future, particularly where water 
management may become even more critical for viable agriculture. The first 
reason relates to the growth in foreign investment in agriculture and the 
likelihood that such investments will require guarantees (formal or informal) 
of priority access to water. In the absence of formal water allocations, there 
is a risk that water use by local agricultural producers will become a residual 
category, to be met once other allocations have been satisfied (Mann and 
Smaller, 2010). A second reason is provided by evidence that increased land 
productivity arising from better water access may be associated with increasing 
competition for land and changing land tenure, including informal land markets, 
even where land remains governed by ‘traditional’ customary authority (Peters 
and Kambewa, 2007). Moreover, unforeseen and informal land markets have 
often characterized irrigation in Africa whether in large-scale formal schemes 
(see Robertson, 1987 on the case of Gezira in Sudan; Aw and Diemer, 2004 
on the Office du Niger, in Mali) or on small-scale farmer-financed schemes 
(see Southgate and Hulme, 2000 on Kenya; Woodhouse et al. 2000, on Mali). 
In such ‘vernacular’ land markets, land allocation can be expected to follow 
purchasing power, but is also shaped by non-market power relations, such 
as those deriving from customary hierarchy, which typically determine who 
has rights to sell or rent land (whether or not such practices are contested 
under ‘custom’). From this perspective, increasing values of land amenable to 
water management may become increasingly subject to market transactions 
(Sale, rent, sharecropping) for the benefit of senior members of customary 
hierarchies, in much the same way as has become commonplace in peri-urban 
areas (Abudulai, 1996 Benjaminsen and Sjaastad, 2002). 
4. concluSionS: technical modelS, political aGency.
At the start of this paper I observed that the conservationist criteria under 
Goal 7 of the Millennium Development Goals create constraints on the increase 
in agricultural areas as a means of raising food production. Achievement of 
progress towards the other MDGs, which hinges critically upon improving 
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nutrition levels, will increasingly depend therefore on raising agricultural 
productivity through intensifying investment. The paper has outlined how highly 
uncertain rainfall has both shaped indigenous African agricultural practice but 
also constitutes the most severe limitation to increasing productivity on the 
savannas that make up most of sub-Saharan Africa. This constraint is likely to 
become more severe as a result of climate change, although in ways that may 
vary greatly from one place to another. 
At the same time, recent policy seems set to raise the intensity of 
competition for water use in agriculture. This arises at a ‘national’ level from 
an intersection of ‘willing buyer’ and ‘willing seller’ originating from quite 
distinct dynamics. The ‘buyers’ are constituted by international corporate 
and sovereign wealth funds for whom investment in agricultural production in 
Africa is driven by escalating concerns over food and energy security and the 
commercial opportunities presented by rising agricultural commodity prices. 
The ‘sellers’ are African governments seeking investment to expand national 
agricultural output and/or influential individuals seeking personal gain through 
the sale or lease of state or customary land. In addition, local competition 
for land that has better moisture availability can also be expected wherever 
there is good access to agricultural markets (typically in peri-urban areas or 
along major roads), mediated in many instances by informal markets. I have 
suggested in this paper that, although many African countries have undertaken 
reforms of land tenure in the past two decades, these may need to be further 
reviewed to more explicitly address rapid processes of commoditisation of land 
dictated by patterns of water availability. It is evident also that, in contrast to 
the parallel ‘sectoral ‘ approach followed to date, policy to support agricultural 
productivity must have consideration of water management at its centre, and 
conversely, decisions on water allocation must address explicitly expectations 
of improved agricultural output and its political and economic effects.
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